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RECENT DECISIONS
that the objectionable expenditures are closely associated with the
illegality complained of, and cannot be disposed of by the maxim
de minimis. The judiciary is also cognizant of the fact that it is
unwise to decide questions in the abstract, or to harass local
government and its agents with a multiplicity of actions in which
the public is not genuinely concerned. But in view of the broad
holding of Altschul v. Ludwig, it seems doubtful whether any tax-
payer will ever be denied standing to complain of conduct which
may injure or affect him and his fellows, though it does not
necessarily affect municipal tax rates.
Conclusion
While Judge Dillon has attempted a theoretical justification
of municipal taxpayers' suits, it seems well to affirm, as did the
South Carolina court,"° that the rule governing public nuisances
simply does not apply in such cases. Certainly in New York,
taxpayers' suits are an attempt to supply a remedy, better
supported by practical considerations than on principle.
Hilary P. Bradford
RECENT DECISIONS
COURTS-QUOTIENT VERDICT RULES HELD
INAPPLICABLE TO TRIAL JUDGE
A widow petitioned to have decedent's real estate set apart
for her, exempt from administration. Creditors objected to a
report which valued the realty at $1500. By statute in Alabama,
homesteads are exempt from execution only to the value of $2,000.
In an action to determine the value of said property, witnesses
testified before a probate judge, who upon completion of the trial
orally stated: "Twenty-seven witnesses have testified in this case
to a total of $47,229, which gives an average figure of $1747, which
is less than $2000. The petition of the widow is therefore granted.
* * *" However, no such statement appeared in the transcript
of the judgment. On appeal the creditors sought to apply the
established principle that a "quotient verdict" of a jury will be
set aside on motion. Held: the ruling of the trial judge is affirmed.
His statements showing the basis on which his conclusion of fact
is founded are not part of the judgment, and on appeal the judg-
50. Gaston v. State Highway Department, 134 S. C. 402, 132 S. E. 680 (1926).
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ment is to be considered separate and apart from such statements.
Beasley v. Beasley, 256 Ala. 647, 57 So. 2d 69 (1952).
The general rule is that a verdict is invalid if rendered as the
result of an express or implied agreement among the jurors to
accept one-twelfth of the aggregate amount of their individual
estimates. Fortson v. Hester, 252 Ala. 143, 39 So. 2d 649 (1949);
International. Agricultural Corp. v. A bercrombie, 184 Ala. 244, 63
So. 549 (1913); Benjamin v. Helena Light d R. Co., 79 Mont. 144,
255 Pac. 20 (1927), see anno. 52 A. L. R. 41 (1928); Smith v.
Cheethzam, 3 Gaines 57 (N. Y. 1805); Harvey v. Rickett, 15 Johns.
S7 (N. Y. 1818); Robert v. Failis, 1 Cow. 238 (N. Y. 1823);
Casstevens v. Texas Pacific Ry. Co., 119 Tex. 463, 32 S. W. 2d 637
(1930), see anno. 73 A. L. R. 93 (1931); contra: Cleveland v.
Carlisle Borough, 186 Pa. 110, 40 Atl. 288 (1898). The objection
is that the traditional jury process of deliberation, consideration,
and judgment is omitted, and a chance or gambling process is
substituted. It is as if twelve individual verdicts were averaged
instead of a reasoned and deliberative collective verdict being
made. Louisville & N. B. v. Marshall, 289 Ky. 129, 158 S. W. 2d
137 (1942). To render such a verdict invalid it is essential that
the agreement be made beforehand to abide by a contingent result.
Dana v. Tucker, 4 Johns. 487 (N. Y. 1809). Such agreement need
not be among all the jurors. Sylvester v. Town of Casey, 110 Iowa
256, 81 N. W. 455 (1900).
However, this practice has been held unobjectionable if the
average so computed is used merely as a basis for discussion and
consideration. Birmingham B. Light & P. Co. v. Clemons, 142 Ala.
160, 37 So. 925 (1904); Dana v. Tucker, supra. The verdict is also
valid if the agreement is made subsequent to the computation of
the quotient, and the latter is deliberately assented to and accepted
as the verdict, Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Hill, 163 Ala. 18, 50 So.
248 (1909) ; or where the quotient method is used but subsequently
repudiated, and after further deliberation the same figure is agreed
upon, Dotham v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264 (1939); Gulling
v. Hinds, 122 Colo. 345, 222 P. 2d 413 (1950), noted 37 VA. L. R.
148. For complete discussion on topic, see Chance and Quotient
Verdicts, 37 VA. L. R. 849 (1951).
A distinction may be drawn between the invalid computation
of the individual jurors' estimates and the averaging of the wit-
nesses' estimates by the jury, which has been held valid, Harrison
v. Powell, 24 Ga. 530 (1858); contra: Illinois B. Co. v. Freeman,
210 Ill. 270, 71 N. E. 444 (1904), if due consideration has been
given to the credibility of such witnesses. Harvey v. Boswell, 65
Ga. 550 (1880).
RECENT DECISIONS
But the foregoing rules as to "quotient verdicts" have no
application to a judgment rendered by a trial judge without a
jury; in the absence of a statute to the contrary, a verdict is a
decision by a jury, while a finding by a judge results in an order
or judgment and not a verdict. fancock v. Oliver, 228 Ala. 548,
154 So. 571 (1934). This rule is applied not only to findings of
fact, Scott v. People, 64 Colo. 396. 172 Pac. 9 (1918), but also to
conclusions of law stated by the judze, whether made during or
after the trial of the case, Amsinck & Co. v. Svringfield Grocer Co.,
7 F. 2d 855 (8th Cir. 1925). Since the decision of the court is its
judgment, while its opinion represents the reasons given for the
judgment, such reasons are no essential part of the decision. Crell
v. Hamrnans, 232 Iowa 95. 5 N. W. 2d 169 (1942), Ombrello v.
Duluth, S. S. & A. Ry.. 252 Mich. 396, 233 N. W 357 (1930);
Galiger v. McNulty, 80 Mont. 339, 260 Pac. 401 (1927), and in the
eyes of the reviewing court are not material if the decision itself
is proper. Thus, it has been held permissible for a court to change
its oral decision, before judgment has been entered. Ritter v.
Johnson, 163 Wash. 153, 300 Pac. 518 (1931); Gates v. Green, 151
Cal. 65, 90 Pac. 189 (1907).
The instant case, therefore, does not depart from established
rules. However, it seems to be one of the rare instances where a
judge sitting as a trier of fact and law expressly referred to a
quotient method. While the trial judge may not have used the
quotient method mechanically, it seems remarkable that, if he gave
due consideration to the credibility and intelligence of the wit-
nesses, he treated them all as equally credible and intelligent.
While the holding is technically correct, it is submitted that the law
should not condone the substitution of any mechanical process for
the time-tested judicial process. In every case the decision or
verdict should be the result of reason, reflection, and conscientious
conviction.
John J. Callahan
COURTS--SUMMARY PUNISHMENT OF CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT
Petitioners were defense counsel for the eleven communists
tried for violations of the Smith Act, Dennis v. United States,
341 U. S. 494 (1950). At the conclusion of the trial, and after
entry of verdict, the trial judge, relying on petitioners' miscon-
duct during the course of the trial, cited them for criminal con-
tempt. In so doing he acted summarily under Rule 42(a) of FED-
ERAL Rums OF CRMIMINAL PROCEDURE. The sole question before the
